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Abstract
We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment
game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property
we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any
matching ν, if, for each agent i there exists a matching µ in the set for which
µ (i) = ν (i), then ν is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency
if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set
maximize the surplus. We also identify conditions under which we can assume
the assignment game has nonnegative values.
1 Introduction
In matching markets, the data we observe are the matchings themselves. Preferences
of agents over each other, cardinal utility, or monetary transfers are typically not
observed. In many matching markets, such as the market which matches hospitals
to interns, no transfers in fact take place. But in other markets, such as housing
markets, buyers and sellers are matched, and transfers do in fact take place. In yet
other markets, such as organ donations, transfers may, but should not, take place.
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In this paper, we ask how we can empirically distinguish between these two types
of markets with data on matchings alone.
We study the testable implications of the standard model of two-sided markets
with flexible prices: the so-called assignment game. The assignment game was
introduced by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1971).
It is the basis for a body of modern economic theories; auction theory being the
best known of these. Theoretical work on the assignment game has focused on
the model’s predicted utilities. Empirical work, on the other hand, deals almost
exclusively with matchings, as utilities and transfers are often unobservable.
We characterize the sets of matchings (i.e. the data on who buys from whom)
which can be generated by the model. An assignment game specifies two sets of
economic agents, usually understood as buyers and sellers; but, following tradition,
we will refer to men and women. Agents have quasilinear preferences over each other
and money. Men can match to women; agents can also remain unmatched. Because
of quasilinearity, each pair consisting of a man and a woman (a couple) generates
some surplus. The games always have nonempty core. Core payoff vectors divide
the maximal possible surplus among the set of agents. We will say a matching is a
core matching if it is one which maximizes this surplus. Our aim in this paper is to
understand the structure of the set of core matchings.
We propose a joint test on observed matchings of the hypotheses that i) utility is
freely transferable and ii) matchings are chosen to maximize aggregate surplus. We
do this by characterizing the exact structure of sets of core matchings of assignment
games. If we therefore know the set of possible matchings that might arise, we can
verify whether or not they could have been generated by a transferable utility model
and surplus maximization.
We show that a set of matchings can be the set of core matchings for an assign-
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ment game if and only if a simple property, which we call consistency, is satisfied.
Consistency of a set of matchings E states the following. Take any matching ν of
men to women. Suppose that if a man is matched to a woman under ν, then there
exists µ ∈ E which matches this man to the same woman. Suppose that if a man is
unmatched under ν, there exists µ ∈ E for which he is unmatched. Suppose similar
statements hold for women. If ν satisfies these properties, then ν must itself be an
element of E. Consistency thus might be viewed as the following: allow each agent
x to choose some µx ∈ E. If the function ν (x) = µx (x) is itself a matching, then ν
must be an element of E as well.
Consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of matchings to be
the core of some assignment game. In fact, more is true. Consistency is satisfied
if and only if a set of matchings is the core of some assignment game with integer
values. Obviously, if matchings are the only observable, these are the only things we
can test. Our results illustrate that, from the point of view of observing matchings,
the complete testable implications of the assignment game come in the form of
consistency of the set of possible matchings.
Consistency has the property that for any set of matchings, there is a unique
smallest consistent extension (with respect to set inclusion). The intersection of an
arbitrary collection of sets of consistent matchings is itself consistent. This property
is useful in environments in which we may observe a set of matchings E and want
to verify whether they can be core matchings for some game. If we know that some
matchings F are necessarily not elements of the core, then for E to be possible core
matchings, we simply need to find the smallest consistent extension of E and verify
that it is disjoint from F . For example, if we generate matchings which are patently
inefficient (e.g. by breaking up matches which should be profitable), we can see if
these can be generated from the matchings in E.
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We also characterize the set of matchings which coincide with the core of an
assignment game where all surpluses are nonnegative. This requires a somewhat
more restrictive notion of consistency (which we term monotone consistency) which
is nonetheless simple to verify.
Two aspects of our results are worth emphasizing.
Firstly, we provide the first characterization of core matchings in the assignment
game. For the model without transferable utility, the Gale-Shapley marriage market,
a characterization has been known for a long time (Knuth, 1976): the core matchings
have a lattice structure. The lattice characterization has been very useful in the
study of these markets. Our result is, in a sense, a counterpart to the lattice result
for the model with transfers.1
Secondly, a well-known observation is that if surpluses are drawn from an ab-
solutely continuous distribution, then the set of core matchings is generically a
singleton. To this end, many researchers have focused on the case in which in fact
there is a unique core matching. Of course, there is no foundation for the hypothesis
surpluses are drawn from an absolutely continuous distribution. We believe that the
hypothesis is not justified empirically, or mathematically. In fact, casual observation
implies that surpluses in fact come in discrete units (pennies, for example).
1.1 Related Literature
Shapley and Shubik (1971) first studied the core of assignment games. They estab-
lish results on the set of core imputations (utilities) in the associated transferable
utility game. In particular, they characterize core imputations through a linear
programming argument. This characterization implies that a matching is a core
1For a characterization exploiting lattice properties of the core, but in payoff-space, see Quint
(1991).
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matching if and only if it supports any core imputation, with each couple sharing
their surplus only amongst themselves. They also show that the set of core imputa-
tions restricted to M (or W ) form a lattice under the pointwise ordering. Shapley
and Shubik present no results on the structure of core matchings.
More recently, Sotomayor (2003) (and later Wako (2006)) establish a relationship
on the cardinality of the set of core matchings and the structure of the set of core
imputations. In particular, these authors establish that if there is only one core
matching, then the set of possible imputations is infinite (the converse is not true
in general). Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2008) study the dimension of the core in the space
of imputations.
Related to this work is an earlier paper by Echenique (2008), which studies a
matching model in which transfers cannot be made, but each side of the market
has strict preferences over the other side. Echenique establishes conditions that are
necessary and sufficient for a collection of matchings to be a subset of core matchings
for some such preference profile. Strictness of preference in this environment is
critical; if preferences are allowed to be weak, all sets of matchings can be the
subset of a set of core matchings for some preference profile (the profile in which all
agents are indifferent between everything). In our work, there is no trivial analogue
of the statement that preferences are strict, and hence statements about subsets
of core matchings require instead knowledge that some matchings cannot be core
matchings.
Section 2 provides the model and main results, while Section 3 is devoted to
proofs. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
Let M and W denote disjoint finite sets of agents. A matching is a function
µ : M ∪W → M ∪W such that for all m ∈ M , µ (m) ∈ W ∪ {m}, for all w ∈ W ,
µ (w) ∈ M ∪ {w}, and for all i ∈ M ∪W , µ (µ (i)) = i. An agent i ∈ M ∪W is
single in µ if µ(i) = i.
If a matching µ satisfies the property that for all m ∈M , µ (m) ∈ W and for all
w ∈ W , µ (w) ∈ M , we will say it is a complete matching ; i.e. a matching µ is
complete if no agent is single in µ. Denote the set of matchings by M and the set
of complete matchings by Mc.
An assignment game α is a matrix [αm,w] ∈ RM×W . The interpretation is
that αm,w is the surplus generated by m and w if they match. We will say an
assignment game α is integer valued if for all (m,w) ∈ M ×W , αm,w ∈ Z. We say
it is nonnegative if for all (m,w) ∈M ×W , αm,w ≥ 0.
A matching µ is a core matching of assignment game α if
µ ∈ arg max
ν∈M
∑
m∈M
∑
w∈W
1ν(m)=wαm,w.
For an assignment game α, denote the set of core matchings by C (α). Our aim
is to understand exactly which sets of matchings coincide with core matchings of
some game α.
We proceed to describe a general model of coalition formation with transfers;
two-sided assignment games are a special case of this model.
Let N be a set of agents; a characteristic function game is a function
v : 2N → R. A coalition structure over N is a partition of N . Let P be a family
of partitions of N .2
2Kaneko and Wooders (1982) is an early reference on this model.
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We interpret P as the set of feasible coalitions. For example, in the assignment
game N = M ∪W and P corresponds to the partitions into pairs and singletons
defined by some matching. Another example is the roommate game, where P cor-
responds to all partitions (Si) of N with |Si| ≤ 2.
If Π is a coalition structure over N , we associate with Π the value
∑
S∈Π
v(S).
A partition Π ∈ P is optimal if its value is maximal in P . Let O (v) denote
the set of all optimal partitions for v.
3 The Results
3.1 General assignment games and consistency.
We will say that a set E ⊆M is consistent if, whenever ν ∈M has the property
that for all i ∈ M ∪W , there exists µ ∈ E for which ν (i) = µ (i), then ν ∈ E. We
can rephrase the definition as follows. Say that a set E of matchings generates a
matching ν ∈ M if, for all i ∈ M ∪W , there is µ ∈ E with ν(i) = µ(i). A set E is
consistent if any matching that it generates is in E.
Theorem 1. Let E ⊆M. The following statements are equivalent.
i) There exists an integer valued assignment game α such that E = C (α).
ii) There exists an assignment game α such that E = C (α).
iii) The set E is consistent.
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The proof of Theorem 1 is in Section 4. There is a simple constructive proof
of the statement that iii) implies i) in the case where all matchings in E are
complete. In that case, one can construct an assignment game by letting αij = 1
if there is µ ∈ E with µ(i) = j, and αij = 0 otherwise. It is easy to verify
that consistency implies E = C(α) with this construction. There is also a simple
proof that ii) implies iii) in the non-negative case (Section 3.2); the proof involves
using Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) theorem on the core payoffs.3 For the general
case of incomplete matchings, we are not aware of a simple proof. In Appendix A
we show why the simple construction does not extend.
Proposition 2. For any set of matchings there is a unique smallest consistent set
which contains it.
Proof. First note that if E and E ′ are consistent sets of matchings, then E ∩ E ′ is
consistent: Let ν ∈ M have the property that for all i there exists µ ∈ E ∩ E ′ for
which ν(i) = µ(i). Then, ν is generated by E and by E ′. By consistency, ν ∈ E∩E ′.
The result follows becauseM is a consistent set of matchings, as the set of consistent
supersets of E if nonempty and closed under intersections.
Note that the smallest consistent set which contains E can be constructed by
successively adding matchings that are generated by E.
Observe that by Proposition 2, we can test whether or not a set of observed
matchings could be a subset of the set of core matchings of some assignment game. In
particular, we may observe some matchings, but be unsure whether or not there are
other matchings which could potentially observed. In order to test this hypothesis,
there must be some set of matchings F which we know are not core matchings.
Let E ′ be the smallest consistent set containing E. Then there is a game α with
3Eran Shmaya pointed this out to us.
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E ⊆ C(α) and F ⊆ M \ C(α) if and only if F ⊆ M \ E ′. This observation yields
the following corollary:
Corollary 3. Let E and F be nonempty disjoint sets of matchings. There is an
assignment game α with E ⊆ C(α) and F ⊆ M \ C(α), if and only if there is no
ν ∈ F that is generated from E.
As a simple application of Theorem 1, note that the matchings defined by the n
cyclic permutations, with n = |W | = |M |, cannot be the core of an assignment game.
Indeed, let M = {mk : k = 1, . . . , n}, W = {wk : k = 1, . . . , n} and consider the set
E of matchings defined by µk(wi) = mi+k mod n, k = 0, . . . , n−1. Let ν(wi) = µ1(wi)
for all i = 3, . . . n and let ν(mi) = w3−i, i = 1, 2. Then ν is generated by E, but ν
is not a cyclic permutation.
3.2 Nonnegative assignment games and monotone consis-
tency.
We may further ask whether there are additional conditions which are required on
a set of matchings E to imply that E is the set of core matchings of an assignment
game with nonnegative entries. Indeed such additional conditions exist. Observe
that it is implicit in the definition of core matchings that single agents generate
zero surplus: they do not contribute to the sum being optimized. It is then to be
expected that the additional conditions on E involve single agents.
We say that a set of matchings E is monotone consistent if and only for all
ν ∈ M, if for all i ∈ M ∪W , either there exists µ ∈ E for which µ (i) = ν (i), or
there exists µ, µ′ ∈ E for which µ (i) = i and µ′ (ν (i)) = ν (i), then ν ∈ E.
Monotone consistency then requires that E not only contain the matchings which
are generated from E, but also those matchings ν for which ν(i) /∈ {µ(i) : µ ∈ E} for
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some i, as long as both i and ν(i) are single in some (possibly different) matchings
in E.
Theorem 4. Let E ⊆M. The following statements are equivalent.
i) There exists a nonnegative integer valued assignment game α such that E =
C (α).
ii) There exists a nonnegative valued assignment game α such that E = C (α).
iii) The set E is monotone consistent.
The proof of Theorem 4 is in Section 4.
Example 5. This simple example illustrates the difference between consistency and
monotone consistency. Let M = {m1,m2,m3,m4} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Con-
sider the matchings µ1 and µ2 with µ1(mk) = wk for k = 1, 2, 3 and µ2(mk) = wk−1
for k = 2, 3, while µ2(m1) = w3 and µ1(m4) = µ2(m4) = m4. Let E = {µ1, µ2}.
There is no nonnegative assignment game α for which E = C (α). On the other hand,
E satisfies consistency. In order to obtain a monotone consistent set of matchings,
we would need to add the matching ν(mk) = wk to E.
The statements in Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 corresponding to monotone
consistency are true, and have very simple proofs.
3.3 General coalition formation with transfers.
We present a characterization for general coalition formation games. The result is
simple and the characterization probably not surprising; its value lies in the contrast
with the results on the assignment game. The characterization for assignment games
(Sections 3.1 and 3.2) involves a stronger and more intuitive condition. We wish to
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emphasize how the two-sided structure of the assignment games makes an important
difference here.
Let (Πi)
n
i=1 and (Π
′
i)
n
i=1 be sequences of partitions in P . Say that (Π′i)ni=1 is
an arrangement of (Πi)
n
i=1 if, for all S, the number of times S is a cell of some
partition in (Πi)
n
i=1 is the same as the number of times it is the cell of some partition
in (Π′i)
n
i=1.
The idea is that the partitions (Π′i)
n
i=1 are constructed using only cells from the
partitions in (Πi)
n
i=1, and such that a cell must be available in (Πi)
n
i=1 as many times
as it is used in (Π′i)
n
i=1. Thus, (Π
′
i)
n
i=1 is an arrangement of (Πi)
n
i=1 if for all Πi of
which S is a cell, there is a distinct Π′i of which S is a cell; and vice versa for all S,
for all Π′i of which S is a cell, there is a distinct Πi of which S is a cell.
For example, with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, consider the following partitions.
Π1 : {1, 2} {3, 4} , {5}
Π2 : {1} {2, 5} , {3} , {4}
Π3 : {1, 2, 3} {4, 5}
Π′1 : {1, 2} , {3} , {4, 5}
Π′2 : {1} , {2, 5} , {3, 4}
Π′3 : {1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5}
Note how (Π′1,Π
′
2,Π
′
3) is an arrangement of (Π1,Π2,Π3).
A set of partitions E ⊆ P is closed under arrangements if, whenever (Π′i)ni=1
is an arrangement of partitions in E, we have Π′i ∈ E, i = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 6. Let E ⊆ P. The following statements are equivalent.
i) There exists an integer valued characteristic function game v : 2N → Z such
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that E = O (v).
ii) There exists a characteristic function game v : 2N → R such that E = O (v).
iii) The set E is closed under arrangements.
The proof of Theorem 6 is in Section 4. The proof is simple. Optimality involves
maximizing a sum of values which only depend on the cells of the partition. Hence,
an arrangement must provide the same value as any sum of maximizing partitions.
The result in Theorem 6 is not surprising. In assignment games, though, the
two-sided structure of the problem provides a stronger characterization.
3.4 Assignment games and general coalition-formation
games.
The two-sided nature of assignment games is responsible for the stronger results in
theorems 1 and 4. The following is the crucial consequence of two-sidedness (for our
purposes).
In general coalition-formation games, one may “generate” a partition from some
sequence (Πi)
n
i=1 in a way that the remaining coalitions cannot be re-arranged into
n − 1 partitions. For example, consider a roommate model with N = {1, 2, 3} and
the partitions
Π1 : {1} {2, 3}
Π2 : {2} {1, 3}
Π3 : {3} {1, 2} ;
these generate (in the obvious sense) the partition into singletons: {1}, {2}, {3}.
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But the remaining cells, {2, 3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, cannot be arranged into a collection
of partitions.
In assignment games, this situation cannot arise. If we generate a matching from
n matchings, then the remaining pairs can always be collected into n−1 matchings;
this is the main thrust of the proof of Theorem 1.
For example, if E = {µ1, µ2, µ3} generates ν /∈ E, then Step 1 in the proof
of Theorem 1 guarantees that, with the pairs (and singletons) that are left after
generating ν, we can always generate two matchings ν ′ and ν ′′. Since surpluses only
depend on individual pairs, the sum of payoffs in all matchings in {ν, nu′, ν ′′} has
to equal the sum of payoffs in all matchings in E. This contradicts that E is the set
of core matchings.
3.5 Assignment games and matching markets with no trans-
fers
We present some examples to clarify the relationship between assignment games and
matching markets without transfers.
First, we show that there are sets of matchings E which can be the core of one
model but not the other. One might initially believe that the model with transfers
should have more predictive power than the model without. This turns out to be
false; our first example shows that the stable matchings for a model without transfers
may never be the core of an assignment game. Second, we present a consistent set of
matchings that cannot be stable, for any preferences in the model without transfers.
The following is a succinct description of the model without transfers (Gale and
Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990): Let M and W be finite, disjoint, sets.
For m ∈ M , a preference , P (m), is a linear order over W ∪ {m}. For w ∈ W , a
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preference , P (w), is a linear order over M ∪ {w}.
Given lists of preferences (P (m))m∈M and (P (w))w∈W , a matching µ is stable
if,
i) for all i ∈M ∪W with µ(i) 6= i, µ(i) P (i) i;
ii) there is no (m,w) ∈M×W with w 6= µ(m) and wP (m)µ(m) and mP (w)µ(w).
Example 7. This example describes an inconsistent set E which is nevertheless a set
of stable matchings. Hence there are sets of stable matchings which cannot be the
core of an assignment game. Let M = {m1,m2,m3,m4} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}.
Consider the preferences:
P (m1) : w1 w2 w3 w4
P (m2) : w2 w1 w4 w3
P (m3) : w3 w4 w1 w2
P (m4) : w4 w3 w2 w1
P (w1) : m4 m3 m2 m1
P (w2) : m3 m4 m1 m2
P (w3) : m2 m1 m4 m3
P (w4) : m1 m2 m3 m4
Then the matchings
m1 m2 m3 m4
µ1 : w2 w4 w1 w3
µ2 : w2 w1 w3 w4
µ3 : w3 w4 w2 w1
are stable. 4 The table means that where µ1(m1) = w2, µ3(m1) = w3, and so on.
The matching
m1 m2 m3 m4
ν : w2 w4 w3 w1
4The preferences in the example are taken from the example in Figures 1.9 and 1.10 in Gusfield
and Irving (1989)
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is generated from {µ1, µ2, µ3} but it is not stable, as w2 P (m4) w1 = ν(m4) and
m4 P (w2)m1 = ν(w2).
There are more stable matchings than those in E = {µ1, µ2, µ3}, but since ν is
generated by E, it is generated by the set of stable matchings. Since ν is unstable,
the set of stable matchings is inconsistent.
Example 8. Our second example is of a consistent set of matchings that can-
not be stable under any preference profile. Let M = {m1,m2,m3,m4} and
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Consider the set E = {µ1, µ2, µ3} of matchings described
as follows:
m1 m2 m3 m4
µ1 : w1 w2 w3 w4
µ2 : w1 w3 w4 w2
µ3 : w2 w3 w1 w4,
The set E is rationalizable as the core of an assignment game, but not as the core
of a marriage matching model. We show that E is consistent. If ν is a matching
generated by E we must have ν(m1) ∈ {w1, w2}. Say that ν(m1) = w1. We must
have ν(m2) ∈ {w2, w3}. If ν(m2) = w2, then ν(m4) = w4 and so ν = µ1. If
ν(m2) = w3 then ν(m3) = w4 (as ν(m1) = w1) so ν(m4) = w2 and ν = µ2. On
the other hand, if ν(m1) = w2 we must have ν(m2) = w3 and ν(m4) = w4. Hence
ν(m3) = w1 and ν = µ3.
On the other hand, the matchings in E cannot be the set of stable matchings of
a non-transferable-utility marriage market. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
(P (m))m∈M and (P (w))w∈W are preference profiles such that the matchings in E
are all stable (admitting that more matchings than those in E might be stable).
Say that w2 P (m2)w3. This rules out the possibility that w2 P (m4)w4, as µ2 would
then be unstable if m2 P (w2) m4 and µ1 would be unstable if m4 P (w2) m2. So we
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must have that w4 P (m4) w2. In turn, this implies that w3 P (m3) w4 by a similar
argument. Now, the stability of µ1 and µ3 and w2 P (m2) w3 implies, by the same
argument as above, that w1 P (m1) w2. Then we obtain that w3 P (m3) w1. Finally,
w1 P (m1) w2 and the stability of µ2 and µ3 obtains that w4 P (m3) w1. But we
established that w4 P (m4)w2, so if m3 P (w4)m4 µ3 is unstable, and if m4 P (w4)m3
then µ2 is unstable.
Note that we obtain the same conclusion if we assume instead that w3P (m2)w2.
The previous example is particularly interesting because all matchings in E are
complete. There are simpler examples based on the property that any two stable
matchings must have the same set of single agents. For example, with two men
and two women, consider the matchings defined by µ1(m1) = µ2(m2) = w1 and
µ1(m2) = m2 and µ2(m1) = m1. This set is evidently consistent, but the two
matchings could not be stable.
4 Proofs
We start with the following lemma, whose proof was shown to us by Kim Border. 5
Lemma 9. (Integer-Real Farkas) Let {Ai}Ki=1 be a finite collection of vectors in Qn.
Then one and only one of the following statements is true:
i) There exists y ∈ Rn such that for all i = 1, ..., L, Ai · y ≥ 0 and for all
i = L+ 1, ..., K, Ai · y > 0.
ii) There exists z ∈ ZK+ such that
∑K
i=1 ziAi = 0, where
∑K
i=L+1 zi > 0.
5Kim Border claims the result is well-known, but we were unable to find a reference. The lemma
is a simple consequence of the standard Farkas’s Lemma and of the rational version of Farkas’s
Lemma (see Gale (1960) and Fishburn (1973) or Fishburn (1971)). It is crucial since it allows one
to relate a primal involving real numbers with a dual involving integers.
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Proof. It is clear that both i) and ii) cannot simultaneously hold. We therefore
establish that if ii) does not hold, i) holds. By Theorem 3.2 of Fishburn (1973), if
ii) does not hold, there exists q ∈ Qn such that for all i = 1, ..., L, Ai · q ≥ 0 and for
all i = L+ 1, ..., K, Ai · q > 0. Hence, q ∈ Rn.
Lemma 10. Let {Ai}Ki=1 be a collection of vectors in Qn. Then there exists y ∈ Rn
such that for all i = 1, ..., L, Ai · y ≥ 0 and for all i = L + 1, ..., K, Ai · y > 0 if
and only if there exists z ∈ Zn such that for all i = 1, ..., L, Ai · z ≥ 0 and for all
i = L+ 1, ..., K, Ai · z > 0.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.2 of Fishburn (1973) and Lemma 9.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We first establish the equivalence of i) and ii). The existence of an assignment game
α is equivalent to the existence of α ∈ RM×W for which for all µ ∈ E and all ν ∈M,
∑
m∈M
∑
w∈W
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
αm,w ≥ 0, (1)
and for all µ ∈ E and all ν /∈ E
∑
m∈M
∑
w∈W
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
αm,w > 0. (2)
As each of the vectors
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
m,w
are rational valued, the claim follows
from Lemma 10.
Now, we establish the equivalence of ii) and iii).
Step 1: A characterization of sums of matrices associated with match-
ings, using Hall’s Theorem.
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The result in this step is closely related to the well-known Birkhoff-von Neumann
Theorem, but is distinct from this result. Let µ ∈ M be a matching. Associated
with this matching is the matrix
(
1µ(m)=w
)
m,w
.
Note that by definition, for all w ∈ W ,
∑
m∈M
1µ(m)=w ≤ 1;
this follows as if µ (m′) = µ (m) = w, thenm = µ (µ (m)) = µ (w) = µ (µ (m′)) = m′.
Likewise, for all m ∈M , ∑
w∈W
1µ(m)=w ≤ 1;
this follows simply as µ as a function. Consequently, if {µ1, ..., µn} is a finite list of
matchings, then for all w ∈ W ,
n∑
i=1
∑
m∈M
1µi(m)=w ≤ n
and for all m ∈M ,
n∑
i=1
∑
w∈W
1µi(m)=w ≤ n.
Conversely, suppose that A ∈ ZM×W+ satisfies for all w ∈ W ,
∑
m∈M
Am,w ≤ n
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and for all m ∈M , ∑
w∈W
Am,w ≤ n,
then there exists a list of matchings {µ1, ..., µn} for which for all (m,w) ∈M ×W ,
Am,w =
n∑
i=1
1µi(m)=w.
To see this, we construct a matrix A′ ∈ Z(M∪W )×(M∪W )+ defined so that for all
m ∈ M , w ∈ W , A′m,w = A′w,m = Am,w, for all m,m′ ∈ M for which m 6= m′,
A′m,m′ = 0, for all w,w
′ ∈ W for which w 6= w′, Aw,w′ = 0, for all m ∈ M ,
A′m,m = n −
∑
w∈W Am,w, and for all w ∈ W , A′w,w = n −
∑
m∈M Am,w. Note in
particular that the matrix A′ has the property that for all x ∈M ∪W
∑
y∈M∪W
A′x,y =
∑
y∈M∪W
A′y,x = n.
Now, consider the correspondence Γ : M ∪W ⇒M ∪W defined by
Γ (x) =
{
y : A′x,y > 0
}
.
We first show that there exists a function γ : M ∪ W → M ∪ W for which
i) for all x ∈ M ∪ W , γ (x) ∈ Γ (x) and ii) for all x, x′ ∈ M for which x 6= x′,
γ (x) 6= γ (x′). To do so, we will use the Theorem of Ko¨nig and Hall, which states
that the existence of such a γ will follow if we can establish that for all F ⊆M ∪W ,∣∣∣∣∣⋃
x∈F
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ |F |(see e.g. Berge (2001), Chapter 10).
We proceed by induction on the cardinality of F . If |F | = 1, then the result is
trivial: let F = {x}, then as ∑y∈M∪W A′x,y = n, there exists y for which A′x,y > 0.
Now suppose the statement is true for all F ⊆M for which |F | ≤ k− 1, and let
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F ′ ⊆M have cardinality |F ′| = k. We shall prove that
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
x∈F ′
Γ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ k. Fix x′ ∈ F ′;
note that by the induction hypothesis
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x∈F ′\{x′}
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ k − 1.
If in fact
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x∈F ′\{x′}
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > k− 1, then as
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
x∈F ′
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x∈F ′\{x′}
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ k, we have
established the claim. So suppose that
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x∈F ′\{x′}
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = k − 1.
As for all x ∈ F ′\ {x′} and all B such that Γ (x) ⊆ B,
∑
y∈B
A′x,y = n,
we obtain ∑
x∈F ′\{x′}
 ∑
y∈ Sx˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ(x˜)
A′x,y
 = n (k − 1) . (3)
On the other hand, for all y ∈
⋃
x˜∈F ′\{x′}
Γ (x˜),
∑
x∈M∪W A
′
x,y = n. Hence,∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x∈F ′\{x′}
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = k − 1 implies that
∑
y∈ Sx˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ(x˜)
[ ∑
x∈M∪W
A′x,y
]
= n (k − 1) .
Reversing sums in the latter equality, and using (3), obtains
∑
x∈M∪W
 ∑
y∈ Sx˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ(x˜)
A′x,y
 = n (k − 1) = ∑
x∈F ′\{x′}
 ∑
y∈ Sx˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ(x˜)
A′x,y
 .
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Consequently,
∑
y∈ Sx˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ(x˜)
A′x′,y ≤
∑
x/∈(F ′\{x′})
 ∑
y∈ Sx˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ(x˜)
A′x,y
 = 0.
Hence A′x′,y = 0 for all y ∈
⋃
x˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ (x˜). Conclude that there exists y /∈⋃
x˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ (x˜) for which Ax′,y > 0, so that Γ (x
′) ⊆ ⋃x˜∈F ′\{x′} Γ (x˜) is false. Hence∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
x∈F ′
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x∈F ′\{x′}
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = k − 1, so that
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
x∈F ′
Γ (x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ k = |F ′|, verifying the
claim.
Let γ be the aforementioned mapping. Importantly, γ (M ∪W ) = M∪W . Now,
for all m ∈M , define µ (m) = γ (m). For all w ∈ W , if w = µ (m) for some m ∈M ,
define µ (w) = m. Otherwise, define µ (w) = w. To see that µ is a matching,
note that we only need to verify that µ (m) /∈ M\ {m}. Suppose by means of
contradiction that µ (m) = m′ ∈M\ {m}. Then in particular, µ(m) ∈ Γ(m), which
implies that A′m,m′ > 0, a contradiction.
We finish the proof of Step 1 by induction. We show that µ induces a matrix
B ∈ ZM×W+ such that A − B is a nonnegative integer valued matrix and for all
m ∈M and w ∈ W :
∑
w˜∈W
(Am,w˜ −Bm,w˜) ≤ n− 1 (4)
∑
m˜∈M
(Am˜,w −Bm˜,w) ≤ n− 1; (5)
thus A−B is under the hypotheses that allowed us to define the matching µ above.
By applying the argument inductively, we show that A defines a collection of match-
ings, as stated in Step 1.
First, let B ∈ ZM×W+ be the matrix [Bm,w] = 1µ(m)=w. We claim that B ≤ A; so
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let (m,w) ∈ M ×W be arbitrary. If Bm,w = 0 then Bm,w ≤ Am,w by assumption
on A. If Bm,w = 1, then µ (m) = w; hence γ (m) = w and Am,w = A
′
m,w > 0.
Consequently, Bm,w ≤ Am,w. This proves that A−B is nonnegative.
Second, we show that (4) holds by showing that, for all m ∈M , if∑w∈W Am,w =
n, then
∑
w∈W 1µ(m)=w = 1. This follows as if
∑
m∈M Am,w = n, then Am,m = 0, so
that Γ (m) ⊆ W , consequently, µ(m) = γ (m) ∈ W . So Bm,γ(m) = 1. Lastly, we
show (5) by showing that for all w ∈ W , if ∑m∈M Am,w = n, then ∑m∈M 1µ(m)=w =
1. So suppose that
∑
m∈M Am,w = n. Then Aw,w = 0. As γ (M ∪W ) = M ∪W ,
there exists some x ∈ M ∪W for which γ (x) = w. But it as Aw,w = 0, γ (w) = w
is impossible. Conclude that there exists some m ∈ M for which γ (m) = w, or
µ (m) = w; hence Bm,w = 1.
Step 2: A characterization of non-existence of a rationalizing assign-
ment game using the Integer-Real Farkas Lemma.
We will show that the converses of ii) and iii) are equivalent. The existence of
an assignment game α for which E = C (α) is equivalent to the existence of α for
which for all µ ∈ E and all ν ∈M,
∑
m∈M
∑
w∈W
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
αm,w ≥ 0,
and for all µ ∈ E and all ν /∈ E
∑
m∈M
∑
w∈W
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
αm,w > 0.
Hence, the nonexistence of such an α is equivalent, by the Lemma 9, to the existence
of a vector z ∈ ZE×M+ such that for some (µ, ν) ∈ E × (M\E), zµ,ν > 0, and for all
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(m,w) ∈M ×W ,
∑
(µ,ν)∈E×M
zµ,ν
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
= 0.
Step 3: Some basic algebraic manipulation.
The non-existence of α with the above properties is equivalent to the existence of
a finite list of matchings {µ1, ..., µn} ⊆ E, and a finite list of matchings {ν1, ..., νn} ⊆
M such that there exists j ∈ {1, ..., n} for which νj ∈ M\E, such that for all
(m,w) ∈M ×W
n∑
i=1
(
1µi(m)=w
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
1νi(m)=w
)
.
Suppose without loss of generality that νn ∈M\E; we rewrite the preceding as
for all (m,w) ∈M ×W ,
[
n∑
i=1
(
1µi(m)=w
)]− (1νn(m)=w) = n−1∑
i=1
(
1νi(m)=w
)
. (6)
The sum on the right of Equality (6) equals a sum of n − 1 matchings. By
Step 1, then, the existence of the two sets of matchings satisfying Equality (6)
is equivalent to the existence of a finite list of matchings {µ1, ..., µn} ∈ E and a
matching ν ∈M \ E such that for all m ∈M
∑
w∈W
[[
n∑
i=1
(
1µi(m)=w
)]− (1ν(m)=w)] ≤ n− 1
and all w ∈ W
∑
m∈M
[[
n∑
i=1
(
1µi(m)=w
)]− (1ν(m)=w)] ≤ n− 1,
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and all pairs (m,w) ∈M ×W , [∑ni=1 (1µi(m)=w)]− (1ν(m)=w) ≥ 0.
The first inequality is satisfied if and only if whenever ν (m) = m, there exists
i for which µi (m) = m. The second inequality is satisfied if and only if whenever
ν (w) = w, there exists i for which µi (w) = w. The last inequality is satisfied if and
only if whenever ν (m) = w, there exists i for which µi (m) = w. The existence of
such matchings therefore occurs if and only if E is not consistent.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4
That i) and ii) are equivalent follow similarly to Theorem 1. For the equivalence of
ii) and iii), note that the existence of a nonnegative valued assignment game α for
which E = C (α) is equivalent to the existence of α ∈ RM×W+ for which for all µ ∈ E
and all ν ∈M, ∑
m∈M
∑
w∈W
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
αm,w ≥ 0,
for all µ ∈ E and all ν /∈ E
∑
m∈M
∑
w∈W
(
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
)
αm,w > 0,
and for all (m,w) ∈M ×W ,
1m,wαm,w ≥ 0.
Hence, the nonexistence of such an α is equivalent, by Lemma 9, to the existence of
a vector z ∈ ZE×M+ such that for some (µ, ν) ∈ E × (M\E), zµ,ν > 0, and a vector
z′ ∈ ZM×W+ for which for all (m,w) ∈M ×W ,
∑
(µ,ν)∈E×M
zµ,ν
[
1µ(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
]
+ z′m,w = 0.
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As in the proof of Theorem 1, this is equivalent to the existence of a finite list of
matchings {µ1, ..., µn} ⊆ E, a finite list of matchings {ν1, ..., νn} ⊆ M such that
there exists j ∈ {1, ..., n} for which νj ∈ M\E, and for all (m,w) ∈ M ×W an
integer zm,w ≥ 0 for which for all (m,w) ∈M ×W ,
[
n∑
i=1
1µi(m)=w
]
=
[
n∑
i=1
1νi(m)=w − zm,w
]
.
Suppose without loss of generality that νn is not an element of E; let ν = νn. There-
fore the previous equality is equivalent to the existence of matchings {µ1, ..., µn} ⊆
E, a matching ν ∈ M\E, and zm,w ≥ 0 for all (m,w) ∈ M ×W for which for all
(m,w) ∈M ×W
[
n∑
i=1
1µi(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w
]
=
[
n−1∑
i=1
1νi(m)=w − zm,w
]
. (7)
For x ∈ R, define x+ = max {0, x}.
The right hand side of (7) satisfies that, for all m ∈M ,
∑
w∈W
[
n−1∑
i=1
1νi(m)=w − zm,w
]+
≤ n− 1
and for all w ∈ W , ∑m∈M∑n−1i=1 [1νi(m)=w − zm,w]+ ≤ n − 1. In contrast to The-
orem 1, the values of the matrix on the right-hand side of (7) may be negative.
However, analogously to the proof of Theorem 1, it can be shown that if a matrix
A ∈ ZM×W satisfies for all m ∈M ,
∑
w∈W
A+m,w ≤ n− 1
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and for all w ∈ W , ∑
m∈M
A+m,w ≤ n− 1,
then there exist matchings {ν1, ..., νn−1} ⊆ M and a vector z ∈ ZM×W+ for which
for all (m,w) ∈M ×W ,
[Am,w] =
[
n−1∑
i=1
1νi(m)=w − zm,w
]
.
This follows from the observation that [Am,w] =
[
A+m,w
]
+
[
A−m,w
]
. Consequently, the
non-existence of α under our condition, is equivalent to the existence of a collection
of matchings {µ1, ..., µn} ⊆ E and ν ∈M\E such that for all w ∈ W ,
∑
m∈M
[([
n∑
i=1
1µi(m)=w
]
− 1ν(m)=w
)+]
≤ n− 1
and for all m ∈M ,
∑
w∈W
[([
n∑
i=1
1µi(m)=w
]
− 1ν(m)=w
)+]
≤ n− 1.
We claim that the first inequality is satisfied if and only if, for all w ∈ W :
1. if ν(w) = w then there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with µi(w) = w.
2. if ν(w) 6= w, then either there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with µi(ν(w)) = w, or
there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with µi(w) = ν(w).
Consider case (1): note that ν(w) = w implies that for all m, 1ν(m)=w = 0. Hence
the first inequality is equivalent to
∑
m
∑
i 1µi(m)=w ≤ n− 1. This is true iff there is
µi in which w is single.
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For case (2), suppose that ν(w) = mˆ 6= w, and that for all i, µi(w) ∈ M . Then∑
m
∑
i 1µi(m)=w = n. So for the first inequality to hold there must be some i with
1µi(m)=w − 1ν(m)=w = 0; that is µi(w) = ν(w).
Similarly, the second inequality is satisfied if and only if for all m ∈ M , if
ν (m) = m, then there exists i for which µi (m) = m, and if ν (m) = w, either there
exists i ∈M for which µi (m) = w or there exists i ∈M for which µi (m) = m.
But the existence of such matchings is equivalent to a violation of monotone
consistency.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 6
That i) and ii) are equivalent follow similarly to Theorem 1.
Let Π ∈ P . We identify Π with the vector 1Π ∈ {0, 1}2N defined by 1ΠS = 1 if
and only if S ∈ Π. We can also identify any characteristic function game v with a
vector v¯ ∈ R2n ; the property that Π is optimal in P is then expressed as, for all
Π′ ∈ P , 1Π · v¯ ≥ 1Π′ · v¯.
Now, E = O (v) iff 1Π · v¯ ≥ 1Π′ · v¯ for all Π ∈ E and Π ∈ P ; and 1Π · v¯ > 1Π′ · v¯
for all Π ∈ E and Π ∈ P \ E. So the property E = O (v) is equivalent to v¯ being
a solution to the system of inequalities defined above; in this system, there is a
weak inequality associated with each pair (Π,Π′) ∈ E × P , and a strict inequality
associated with each pair (Π,Π′) ∈ E × P \ E.
There is a solution to the system iff there is are no collections of non-negative
integers (z(Π,Π′))(Π,Π′)∈E×P and (z′(Π,Π′))(Π,Π′)∈E×P\E, with at least one of the latter
being strictly positive, s.t.
∑
(Π,Π′)∈E×P
z(Π,Π′)(1
Π − 1Π′) +
∑
(Π,Π′)∈E×P\E
z′(Π,Π′)(1
Π − 1Π′) = 0
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The collections (z(Π,Π′))(Π,Π′)∈E×P and (z′(Π,Π′))(Π,Π′)∈E×P\E define a sequence Πi,
i = 1 . . . n in E and a sequence Π′i i = 1 . . . n in P , with at least one Π′i ∈ P \ E,
with the property that
n∑
i=1
1Πi =
n∑
i=1
1Π
′
i . (8)
Property (8) says that (Π′i) is an arrangement of (Πi): The number of times a
set S ⊆ N appears as a cell of some Πi is the same as the number it appears as a
cell of some Π′i.
5 Conclusion
This work has studied the structure of the set of core matchings of assignment
games. This structure is relevant as in many real-world scenarios, transfers may not
be observed, but the actual matchings are. We discuss some related questions which
may be analyzed using similar techniques.
First is the question of assortative matchings (Becker (1973)). Becker establishes
that, when men and women have equal cardinalities and each set is linearly ordered,
if the resulting function α is strictly supermodular and strictly positive, then the
resulting (unique) core matching is assortative. That is, it matches the “best” man
with the “best” woman, the second best man with the second best woman, and so
forth. The converse of this result is also easily seen to be true; that is, if a unique
core matching is assortative, then it can be rationalized with a strictly supermodular
assignment game. Simply let α be any strictly supermodular assignment game and
note that there is a unique assortative core matching, which is the matching under
consideration. Generalizing this result to the case of different cardinalities of men
and women, and the case of weakly supermodular and potentially negative α is an
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open question which is amenable to linear programming analysis.
Related is the question which asks, given an assignment game α, which sets of
ordinal preferences are compatible with it? This question only makes sense if we
explicitly model the underlying transferable utility model which defines α. One
standard example is when M is a set of buyers of objects, and W is a set of sellers of
objects. Each m ∈ W has a valuation um (w) of the object w ∈ W is selling. Each
w ∈ W has a valuation vw of the object she sells. The surplus αm,w is then obviously
um (w) − vw. The question is then, given α, which lists of preferences (P (m))m∈M
have utility representations um which generate α? Further questions might be asked
as to when is it the case that vw (w) ≥ 0 (that is, when is it the case that each
seller would rather keep her object than throw it away?) Note that in particular
that a utility representation must satisfy the requirement that um (m) = 0. This
question can also be addressed using linear programming techniques. Similarly, one
can ask a related question about synergistic matching, in which each m ∈ M and
each w ∈ W has preferences, and the surplus associated with utility functions is
given by αm,w = um (w) + uw (m).
Also related is the question of efficient sets of matchings when preferences are not
necessarily quasilinear, which again only makes sense in a model where preferences
over objects sold are explicitly modeled. Such models are related to Alkan, Demange,
and Gale (1991) (for example).
A Problems with extending the construction.
We outlined a simple constructive proof for the case where all matchings are com-
plete. There are two problems when one tries to extend the proof to the general
case. Firstly, it is not enough to assign pairs ij a value of 0, 1 or −1. Secondly, one
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cannot assign ij a value that depends on the optimal matchings to which ij belongs.
So one cannot construct the matrix of surpluses by an algorithm that ranges over
the optimal matchings.
To illustrate the first problem, consider the following example. Suppose there
are two men and two women, and the optimal matchings are:
µ1 =
 0 1
1 0
 µ2 =
 1 0
0 0
 µ3 =
 1 0
0 1
 ,
where there’s a 1 in entry ij of the matrix iff agents i and j are matched.
Then the optimality of µ1 would imply that we need to have values of 1 in entries
α1,2 and α2,1 of the surplus matrix. Then µ2 and µ3 implies that we must have a
value of 0 in α2,2 and of 2 in α1,1. So the matrix must be:
α =
 2 1
1 0

where the matrix (αij) describes the surplus αij available to i and j if they match.
To illustrate the second problem, consider instead a market with three men and
women. Let the optimal matchings be
µ1 =

0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
 µ2 =

0 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
 .
Here all the pairs in the cross diagonal are in one complete matching, which suggests
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one wants to set 
1
1
1

Then, one of α3,2 and α2,3 must be a 2. Say we set α3,2 = 2. But then α1,2 +α3,2 = 3
and thus a third matchings different from µ1 and µ2 must be optimal.
The only possibility is to set one of the pairs on the cross diagonal to have a
surplus of 2. In fact, we need to set
α =

−1 −1 1
−1 2 2
1 2 −1
 .
Thus, in the example pairs that belong to the same set of optimal matchings have
different surpluses. A constructive proof would have to choose αij based on all the
optimal matchings and not only the matchings that contain the edge ij.
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